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ABSTRACT
Adversarial training (AT) is one of the most effective strategies for promoting
model robustness. However, recent benchmarks show that most of the proposed
improvements on AT are less effective than simply early stopping the training pro-
cedure. This counter-intuitive fact motivates us to investigate the implementation
details of tens of AT methods. Surprisingly, we find that the basic training settings
(e.g., weight decay, learning rate schedule, etc.) used in these methods are highly
inconsistent, which could largely affect the model performance as shown in our
experiments. For example, a slightly different value of weight decay can reduce
the model robust accuracy by more than 7%, which is probable to override the
potential promotion induced by the proposed methods. In this work, we provide
comprehensive evaluations on the effects of basic training tricks and hyperparam-
eter settings for adversarially trained models. We provide a reasonable baseline
setting and re-implement previous defenses to achieve new state-of-the-art results1.
1 INTRODUCTION
Adversarial training (AT) has been one of the most effective defense strategies against adversarial
attacks (Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015). Based on the primary
AT frameworks like PGD-AT (Madry et al., 2018), many improvements have been proposed from
different perspectives, and demonstrate promising results (detailed in Sec. 2). However, the recent
benchmarks (Croce & Hein, 2020b; Chen & Gu, 2020) find that simply early stopping the training
procedure of PGD-AT (Rice et al., 2020) can attain the gains from almost all the previously proposed
improvements, including the state-of-the-art TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b).
This fact is somewhat striking since TRADES also executes early stopping (one epoch after decaying
the learning rate) in the code implementation2, as clarified in Rice et al. (2020). Besides, the reported
robustness of PGD-AT in Rice et al. (2020) is much higher than it in Madry et al. (2018), even
without early-stopping. These motivate us to check the implementation details of Rice et al. (2020)3,
and compare the basic hyperparameter settings with TRADES. We find that TRADES uses weight
decay of 2× 10−4 and eval mode of batch normalization (BN) when crafting adversarial examples,
while Rice et al. (2020) use weight decay of 5× 10−4 and train mode of BN to generate adversarial
examples. In our experiments (e.g., Table 8), we show that the two slightly different settings can
differ the robust accuracy by ∼ 4%, which is significant according to the reported benchmarks.
To have a comprehensive study, we further investigate the implementation details of tens of papers
working on the AT methods, some of which are summarized in Table 1. We find that even using
the same model architectures, the basic hyperparameter settings (e.g., weight decay, learning rate
schedule, etc.) used in these papers are highly inconsistent and customized, which could affect the
model performance and may override the gains from the methods themselves. Under this situation,
if we directly benchmark these methods using their released code or checkpoints, some actually
effective improvements would be under-estimated due to the improper hyperparameter settings.
Our contributions. We evaluate the effects of a wide range of basic training tricks (e.g., warmup,
early stopping, weight decay, batch size, BN mode, etc.) on the adversarially trained models. Our
empirical results suggest that improper training settings can largely degenerate the model performance,
while this degeneration may be mistakenly ascribed to the methods themselves. We provide a baseline
recipe for PGD-AT on CIFAR-10 as an example, and demonstrate the generality of the recipe on
1Code is available at https://github.com/P2333/Bag-of-Tricks-for-AT
2https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES
3https://github.com/locuslab/robust_overfitting
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Table 1: Hyperparameter settings and tricks used to implement different AT methods on CIFAR-10.
We convert the training steps into epochs, and provide code links for reference in Table 10. Compared
to the model architectures, the listed settings are easy to be neglected and paid less attention to unify.
Method l.r. Total epoch Batch Weight Early stop Warm-up(l.r. decay) size decay (train / attack) (l.r. / pertub.)
Madry et al. (2018) 0.1 200 (100, 150) 128 2× 10−4 No / No No / No
Cai et al. (2018) 0.1 300 (150, 250) 200 5× 10−4 No / No No / Yes
Zhang et al. (2019b) 0.1 76 (75) 128 2× 10−4 Yes / No No / No
Wang et al. (2019) 0.01 120 (60, 100) 128 1× 10−4 No / Yes No / No
Qin et al. (2019) 0.1 110 (100, 105) 256 2× 10−4 No / No No / Yes
Mao et al. (2019) 0.1 80 (50, 60) 50 2× 10−4 No / No No / No
Carmon et al. (2019) 0.1 100 (cosine anneal) 256 5× 10−4 No / No No / No
Alayrac et al. (2019) 0.2 64 (38, 46, 51) 128 5× 10−4 No / No No / No
Shafahi et al. (2019b) 0.1 200 (100, 150) 128 2× 10−4 No / No No / No
Zhang et al. (2019a) 0.05 105 (79, 90, 100) 256 5× 10−4 No / No No / No
Zhang & Wang (2019) 0.1 200 (60, 90) 60 2× 10−4 No / No No / No
Atzmon et al. (2019) 0.01 100 (50) 32 1× 10−4 No / No No / No
Wong et al. (2020) 0∼0.2 30 (one cycle) 128 5× 10−4 No / No Yes / No
Rice et al. (2020) 0.1 200 (100, 150) 128 5× 10−4 Yes / No No / No
Ding et al. (2020) 0.3 128 (51, 77, 102) 128 2× 10−4 No / No No / No
Pang et al. (2020a) 0.01 200 (100, 150) 50 1× 10−4 No / No No / No
Zhang et al. (2020) 0.1 120 (60, 90, 110) 128 2× 10−4 No / Yes No / No
Huang et al. (2020) 0.1 200 (cosine anneal) 256 5× 10−4 No / No Yes / No
Cheng et al. (2020) 0.1 200 (80, 140, 180) 128 5× 10−4 No / No No / No
Lee et al. (2020) 0.1 200 (100, 150) 128 2× 10−4 No / No No / No
Xu et al. (2020) 0.1 120 (60, 90) 256 1× 10−4 No / No No / No
training other frameworks like TRADES. As seen in Table 13, the retrained TRADES achieve new
state-of-the-art performance on the AutoAttack benchmark (Croce & Hein, 2020b).
Although our empirical conclusions may not generalize to other datasets or tasks, we reveal the
facts that adversarially trained models could be sensitive to certain training settings, which are
usually neglected in previous work. These results also encourage the community to re-implement the
previously proposed defenses with fine-tuned training settings to better explore their potentials.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce related work on the adversarial defenses and recent benchmarks. We
detail on the adversarial attacks in Appendix A.1.
2.1 ADVERSARIAL DEFENSES
To alleviate the adversarial vulnerability of deep learning models, a large number of defense strategies
have been proposed, but most of them can eventually be evaded by adaptive attacks (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017b; Athalye et al., 2018). Other more theoretically guaranteed routines include training
provably robust networks (Dvijotham et al., 2018a;b; Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017; Wong & Kolter,
2018) and obtaining certified models via randomized smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019). While these
methods are exciting, they cannot match the state-of-the-art robustness under empirical evaluations.
The idea of adversarial training (AT) stems from the seminal work of Goodfellow et al. (2015), while
other AT frameworks like PGD-AT (Madry et al., 2018) and TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b) occupied
the winner solutions in the adversarial competitions (Kurakin et al., 2018; Brendel et al., 2020).
Based on these primary AT frameworks, many improvements have been proposed via encoding
the mechanisms inspired from other domains, including ensemble learning (Tramèr et al., 2018;
Pang et al., 2019), metric learning (Mao et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019; Pang et al., 2020c), generative
modeling (Jiang et al., 2018; Pang et al., 2018b; Wang & Yu, 2019; Deng et al., 2020), semi-
supervised learning (Carmon et al., 2019; Alayrac et al., 2019; Zhai et al., 2019), and self-supervised
learning (Hendrycks et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020a;b; Naseer et al., 2020). On the other hand, due to
the high computational cost of AT, many efforts are devoted to accelerating the training procedure via
2
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Table 2: Test accuracy (%) under different early stopping and warmup on CIFAR-10. The model is
ResNet-18. For early stopping on attack iterations, we denote, e.g., 40 / 70 as the epochs to increase
the tolerance step by one (Zhang et al., 2020). For warmup, the learning rate (l.r.) and the maximal
perturbation (perturb.) linearly increase from zero to the preset value in the first 10 / 15 / 20 epochs.
Base
Early stopping attack iter. Warmup on l.r. Warmup on perturb.
40 / 70 40 / 100 60 / 100 10 15 20 10 15 20
Clean 82.52 86.52 86.56 85.67 82.45 82.64 82.31 82.64 82.75 82.78
PGD-10 53.58 52.65 53.22 52.90 53.43 53.29 53.35 53.65 53.27 53.62
AA 48.51 46.6 46.04 45.96 48.26 48.12 48.37 48.44 48.17 48.48
reusing the computations (Shafahi et al., 2019b; Zhang et al., 2019a), adaptive adversarial steps (Wang
et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2020) or one-step training (Wong et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Vivek B
& Venkatesh Babu, 2020). The following works try to solve the side effects (e.g., catastrophic
overfitting) caused by these fast AT methods (Andriushchenko & Flammarion, 2020; Li et al., 2020).
2.2 ADVERSARIAL BENCHMARKS
Due to the large number of proposed defenses, several benchmarks have been developed to rank the
adversarial robustness of existing methods. Dong et al. (2020) perform large-scale experiments to
generate robustness curves, which are used for evaluating typical defenses. Croce & Hein (2020b)
propose AutoAttack, which is an ensemble of four selected attacks. They apply AutoAttack on tens
of previous defenses and provide a comprehensive leader board. Chen & Gu (2020) propose the
black-box RayS attack, and establish a similar leader board for defenses. In this paper, we mainly
apply PGD attack and AutoAttack as two common ways to evaluate the models.
Except for the adversarial robustness, there are other efforts that introduce augmented datasets for
accessing the robustness against general corruptions or perturbations. Mu & Gilmer (2019) introduce
MNIST-C with a suite of 15 corruptions applied to the MNIST test set, while Hendrycks & Dietterich
(2019) introduce ImageNet-C and ImageNet-P with common corruptions and perturbations on natural
images. Evaluating robustness on these datasets can reflect the generality of the proposed defenses,
and avoid overfitting to certain attacking patterns (Engstrom et al., 2019; Tramèr & Boneh, 2019).
3 BAG OF TRICKS
Our overarching goal is to investigate how the implementation details affect the performance of
the adversarially trained models. Our experiments are done on CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton,
2009) under the `∞ threat model of maximal perturbation  = 8/255, without accessibility to
additional data. We evaluate the models under 10-steps PGD attack (PGD-10) (Madry et al., 2018)
and AutoAttack (AA) (Croce & Hein, 2020b). We consider some basic training tricks and perform
ablation studies on each of them, based on the default training setting as described below:
Default setting. Following Rice et al. (2020), in the default setting, we apply the primary PGD-AT
framework and the hyperparameters including batch size 128; SGD momentum optimizer with the
initial learning rate of 0.1; weight decay 5× 10−4; ReLU activation function and no label smoothing;
train mode for batch normalization when crafting adversarial examples. All the models are trained
for 110 epochs with the learning rate decays by a factor of 0.1 at 100 and 105 epochs, respectively.
We report the results on the checkpoint with the best PGD-10 accuracy.
Note that our empirical observations and conclusions may not always generalize to other datasets or
AT frameworks, but we emphasize the importance of using consistent implementation details (not
only the same model architectures) to enable fair comparisons among different AT methods.
3.1 EARLY STOPPING AND WARMUP
Early stopping training epoch. The trick of early stopping w.r.t. the training epoch was first applied
in the code implementation of TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019b), where the learning rate decays at
75 epoch and the training is stopped at 76 epoch. Later Rice et al. (2020) provide a comprehensive
study on the overfitting phenomenon in AT, and advocate early stopping the training epoch as a
general strategy for preventing adversarial overfitting, which could be triggered according to the PGD
accuracy on a split validation set. Due to its effectiveness, we regard this trick as a default choice.
3
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Table 3: Test accuracy (%) under different batch
size and learning rate (l.r.) on CIFAR-10. The
basic l.r. is 0.1, while the scaled l.r. is, e.g., 0.2 for
batch size 256, and 0.05 for batch size 64.
ResNet-18
Batch Basic l.r. Scaled l.r.
size Clean PGD-10 Clean PGD-10
64 80.08 51.31 82.44 52.48
128 82.52 53.58 - -
256 83.33 52.20 82.24 52.52
512 83.40 50.69 82.16 53.36
WRN-34-10
Batch Basic l.r. Scaled l.r.
size Clean PGD-10 Clean PGD-10
64 84.20 54.69 85.40 54.86
128 86.07 56.60 - -
256 86.21 52.90 85.89 56.09
512 86.29 50.17 86.47 55.49
Table 4: Test accuracy (%) under differ-
ent degrees of label smoothing (LS) on
CIFAR-10. We evaluate the models under
AutoAttack to avoid gradient obfuscation.
ResNet-18
LS Clean PGD-10 AutoAttack
0 82.52 53.58 48.51
0.1 82.69 54.04 48.76
0.2 82.73 54.22 49.20
0.3 82.51 54.34 49.24
0.4 82.39 54.13 48.83
WRN-34-10
LS Clean PGD-10 AutoAttack
0 86.07 56.60 52.19
0.1 85.96 56.88 52.74
0.2 86.09 57.31 53.00
0.3 85.99 57.55 52.70
0.4 86.19 57.63 52.71
Table 5: Test accuracy (%) using different optimizers on CIFAR-10. The model is ResNet-18. The
initial learning rate for Adam and AdamW is 0.0001, while for other optimizers is 0.1.
Mom Nesterov Adam AdamW SGD-GC SGD-GCC
Clean 82.52 82.83 83.20 81.68 82.77 82.93
PGD-10 53.58 53.78 48.87 46.58 53.62 53.40
AutoAttack 48.51 48.22 44.04 42.39 48.33 48.51
Early stopping adversarial intensity. Another level of early stopping happens on the adversarial
intensity, e.g., early stopping PGD steps when crafting adversarial examples for training. This trick
was first applied by the runner-up of the defense track in NeurIPS 2018 adversarial vision chal-
lenge (Brendel et al., 2020). Later efforts are devoted to formalizing this early stopping mechanism
with different trigger rules (Wang et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2020). Balaji et al. (2019) early stop
the adversarial perturbation, which has a similar effect on the adversarial intensity. In the left part
of Table 2, we evaluate the method proposed by Zhang et al. (2020) due to its simplicity. As seen,
this kind of early stopping can improve the performance on clean data while keeping comparable
accuracy under PGD-10. However, the performance under the stronger AutoAttack is degraded.
Warmup w.r.t. learning rate. Warmup w.r.t. learning rate is a general trick for training deep learning
models (Goodfellow et al., 2016). In the adversarial setting, Wong et al. (2020) show that the one
cycle learning rate schedule is one of the critical ingredients for the success of FastAT. Thus, we
evaluate the effect of this trick for the piecewise learning rate schedule and PGD-AT framework. We
linearly increase the learning rate from zero to the preset value in the first 10 / 15 / 20 epochs. As
shown in the middle part of Table 2, the effect of warming up learning rate is marginal.
Warmup w.r.t. adversarial intensity. In the AT procedure, warmup can also be executed w.r.t. the
adversarial intensity. Cai et al. (2018) propose the curriculum AT process to gradually increase
the adversarial intensity and monitor the overfitting trend. Qin et al. (2019) increase the maximal
perturbation  from zero to 8/255 in the first 15 epochs. In the right part of Table 2, we linearly
increase the maximal perturbation in the first 10 / 15 / 20 epochs, while the effect is still limited.
3.2 TRAINING HYPERPARAMETERS
Batch size. On the large-scale datasets like ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009), it has been recognized that
the mini-batch size is an important factor influencing the model performance (Goyal et al., 2017),
where larger batch size traverses the dataset faster but requires more memory usage. In the adversarial
setting, Xie et al. (2019) use a batch size of 4096 to train a robust model on ImageNet, which achieves
state-of-the-art performance under adversarial attacks. As to the defenses reported on the CIFAR-10
4
Preprint and under review
Table 6: Test accuracy (%) under different non-linear activation function on CIFAR-10. The model
is ResNet-18. We apply the hyperparameters recommended by Xie et al. (2020) on ImageNet for the
activation function. Here the notation ‡ indicates using weight decay of 5× 10−5, where applying
weight decay of 5× 10−4 with these activations will lead to much worse model performance.
ReLU Leaky. ELU ‡ CELU ‡ SELU ‡ GELU Softplus Tanh ‡
Clean 82.52 82.11 82.17 81.37 78.88 80.42 82.80 80.13
PGD-10 53.58 53.25 52.08 51.37 49.53 52.21 54.30 49.12
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Figure 1: (a) Test accuracy w.r.t. different values of weight decay. The reported checkpoints
correspond to the best PGD-10 accuracy (Rice et al., 2020). We test on two model architectures, and
highlight (with red circles) three most commonly used weight decays in previous work; (b) Curves
of test accuracy w.r.t. training epochs, where the model is WRN-34-10. We set weight decay be
1× 10−4, 2× 10−4, and 5× 10−4, respectively. We can observe that smaller weight decay can learn
faster but also more tend to overfit w.r.t. the robust accuracy. In Fig. 3, we early decay the learning
rate before the models overfitting, but weight decay of 5× 10−4 still achieve better robustness.
dataset, the mini-batch sizes are usually chosen between 128 and 256, as shown in Table 1. To
evaluate the effect, we test on two model architectures and four values of batch size in Table 3.
Since the number of training epochs is fixed to 110, we also consider applying the linear scaling
rule introduced in Goyal et al. (2017), i.e., when the mini-batch size is multiplied by k, multiply the
learning rate by k. We treat the batch size of 128 and the learning rate of 0.1 as a basic setting to
obtain the factor k. We can observe that the batch size of 128 works well on CIFAR-10, while the
linear scaling rule can benefit the cases with other batch sizes.
Label smoothing. Shafahi et al. (2019a) propose to utilize label smoothing to mimic the AT
procedure. Pang et al. (2019) also find that imposing label smoothing on the ensemble prediction can
alleviate the adversarial transferability among individual members, and thus promote robustness of
the ensemble model. Beyond previous observations, we further evaluate the effect of label smoothing
on AT under stronger AutoAttack, which can rule out gradient obfuscation. As shown in Table 4, label
smoothing can improve ∼ 1% accuracy under PGD-10 and AutoAttack, without affecting the clean
performance. This can be regarded as the effect induced by calibrating the confidence (Stutz et al.,
2020) of adversarially trained models (80% ∼ 85% accuracy on clean data). However, excessive
label smoothing could degrade the robustness (e.g., LS = 0.3 vs. LS = 0.4 on ResNet-18 shown in
Table 4), which is consistent with the recent observations in Jiang et al. (2020) (they use LS = 0.5).
5
Preprint and under review
Table 7: Test accuracy (%) under different BN modes on CIFAR-10. We evaluate across several
model architectures, since the BN layers have different positions in different models.
BN Model architecture
mode ResNet-18 SENet-18 DenseNet-121 GoogleNet DPN26 WRN-34-10
Clean
train 82.52 82.20 85.38 83.97 83.67 86.07
eval 83.48 84.11 86.33 85.26 84.56 87.38
- +0.96 +1.91 +0.95 +1.29 +0.89 +1.31
PGD-10
train 53.58 54.01 56.22 53.76 53.88 56.60
eval 53.64 53.90 56.11 53.77 53.41 56.04
- +0.06 -0.11 -0.11 +0.01 -0.47 -0.56
AA
train 48.51 48.72 51.58 48.73 48.50 52.19
eval 48.75 48.95 51.24 48.83 48.30 51.93
- +0.24 +0.23 -0.34 +0.10 -0.20 -0.26
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Figure 2: Clean accuracy vs. PGD-10 accuracy for different model architectures. The circle sizes
are proportional to the number of parameters that specified in Table 11.
Optimizer. Most of the AT methods apply SGD with momentum as the optimizer. The momentum
factor is usually set to be 0.9 with zero dampening. In other cases, Carmon et al. (2019) apply SGD
with Nesterov, and Rice et al. (2020) apply Adam for cyclic learning rate schedule. We test some
commonly used optimizers in Table 5, as well as the decoupled AdamW (Loshchilov & Hutter, 2019)
and the recently proposed gradient centralization trick SGD-GC / SGD-GCC (Yong et al., 2020).
We can find that SGD-based optimizers (e.g., Mom, Nesterov, SGD-GC / SGD-GCC) have similar
performance, while Adam / AdamW performs worse for piecewise learning rate schedule.
Weight decay. As observed in Table 1, the weight decay in previous work almost falls in three values:
1× 10−4, 2× 10−4, and 5× 10−4. While 5× 10−4 is a fairly widely used value for weight decay
in deep learning, the prevalence of the value 2× 10−4 should stem from Madry et al. (2018) in the
adversarial setting. In Fig. 1(a), we report the best test accuracy under different values of weight
decay4. We can see that the gap of robust accuracy can be significant due to slightly different values
of weight decay (e.g., up to ∼ 7% for 1 × 10−4 vs. 5 × 10−4). Besides, in Fig. 1(b) we plot the
learning curves of test accuracy w.r.t. training epochs. Note that smaller values of weight decay make
the model learn faster in the initial phase, but the overfitting phenomenon also appears earlier. As a
result, weight decay is a critical and usually neglected ingredient that largely influences the robust
accuracy of adversarially trained models. In contrast, the clean accuracy is much less sensitive to the
choice of weight decay, for both adversarially and standardly (shown in Fig. 4) trained models.
Activation function. Most of the previous AT methods apply ReLU as the non-linear activation
function in their models, while Xie et al. (2020) empirically demonstrate that smooth activation
functions can better improve model robustness on ImageNet. Following their settings, we test if a
similar conclusion holds on CIFAR-10. By comparing the results on ReLU and Softplus in Table 6
(for PGD-AT) and Table 12 (for TRADES), we confirm that smooth activation indeed benefits model
4Note that Rice et al. (2020) also investigate the effect of different weight decay (i.e., `2 regularization), but
they focus on a coarse value range of {5× 10k}, where k ∈ {−4,−3,−2,−1, 0}.
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Table 8: The default hyperparameters include batch size 128 and SGD momentum optimizer. The AT
framework is PGD-AT. We highlight the setting used by the implementation in Rice et al. (2020).
Architecture Label Weight Activation BN Accuracysmooth decay function mode Clean PGD-10 AA
WRN-34-10
0 1× 10−4 ReLU train 85.87 49.45 46.43
0 2× 10−4 ReLU train 86.14 52.08 48.72
0 5× 10−4 ReLU train 86.07 56.60 52.19
0 5× 10−4 ReLU eval 87.38 56.04 51.93
0 5× 10−4 Softplus train 86.60 56.44 52.70
0.1 5× 10−4 Softplus train 86.42 57.22 53.01
0.1 5× 10−4 Softplus eval 86.34 56.38 52.21
0.2 5× 10−4 Softplus train 86.10 56.55 52.91
0.2 5× 10−4 Softplus eval 86.98 56.21 52.10
WRN-34-20
0 1× 10−4 ReLU train 86.21 49.74 47.58
0 2× 10−4 ReLU train 86.73 51.39 49.03
0 5× 10−4 ReLU train 86.97 57.57 53.26
0 5× 10−4 ReLU eval 87.62 57.04 53.14
0 5× 10−4 Softplus train 85.80 57.84 53.64
0.1 5× 10−4 Softplus train 85.69 57.86 53.66
0.1 5× 10−4 Softplus eval 87.86 57.33 53.23
0.2 5× 10−4 Softplus train 84.82 57.93 53.39
0.2 5× 10−4 Softplus eval 87.58 57.19 53.26
robustness for ResNet-18. However, as shown in Table 8 (for PGD-AT) and Table 9 (for TRADES),
this benefit is less significant on larger models like WRN. Thus we deduce that smaller model capacity
can benefit more from the smoothness of activation function. Besides, as shown in Table 6, models
trained on CIFAR-10 seem to prefer activation function σ(x) with zero truncation, i.e., σ(x) ≥ 0.
Those with negative return values like ELU, LeakyReLU, Tanh have worse performance than ReLU.
Model architecture. Su et al. (2018) provide a comprehensive study on the robustness of standardly
trained models, using different model architectures. For the adversarially trained models, it has been
generally recognized that larger model capacity can usually lead to better robustness (Madry et al.,
2018). Recently, Guo et al. (2020) blend in the technique of AutoML to explore robust architectures.
In Fig. 2, we perform similar experiments on more hand-crafted model architectures. The selected
models have comparable numbers of parameters. We can observe that DenseNet can achieve both
the best clean and robust accuracy, while being memory-efficient (but may require longer inference
time). This is consistent with the observation in Guo et al. (2020) that residual connections can
benefit the AT procedure. Interestingly, Wu et al. (2020) demonstrate that residual connections allow
easier generation of highly transferable adversarial examples, while in our case this weakness for the
standardly trained models may turn out to strengthen the adversarially trained models.
Batch normalization (BN) mode. When crafting adversarial examples in the training procedure,
Zhang et al. (2019b) use eval mode for BN, while Rice et al. (2020) and Madry et al. (2018) use train
mode for BN. Since the parameters in the BN layers are not updated in this progress, the difference
between these two modes is mainly on the recorded moving average BN mean and variance used in
the test phase. As pointed out in Xie & Yuille (2020), properly dealing with BN layers is critical to
obtain a well-performed adversarially trained model. Thus in Table 7, we employ the train or eval
mode of BN for crafting adversarial examples during training, and report the results on different
model architectures to dig out general rules. As seen, using eval mode for BN can increase clean
accuracy, while keeping comparable robustness. We also advocate for the eval mode, because if we
apply train mode for multi-step PGD attack, the BN mean and variance will be recorded for every
intermediate step, which could blur the adversarial distribution used by BN layers during inference.
Takeaways:
(i) Slightly different values of weight decay could largely affect the robustness of trained models;
(ii) Moderate label smoothing and linear scaling rule on l.r. for different batch sizes are beneficial;
(iii) Applying eval BN mode to craft training adversarial examples can avoid blurring the distribution;
(iv) Early stopping the adversarial steps or perturbation may degenerate worst-case robustness;
(v) Smooth activation benefits more when the model capacity is not enough for adversarial training.
7
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Table 9: Test accuracy (%). The AT framework is TRADES. We highlight the setting used by the
original implementation in Zhang et al. (2019b). As listed in Table 13, our retrained TRADES models
can achieve state-of-the-art performance in the AutoAttack benchmark.
Threat model: `∞ constraint,  = 0.031
Architecture Weight decay BN mode Activation Clean PGD-10 AA
WRN-34-10
2× 10−4 train ReLU 83.86 54.96 51.52
2× 10−4 eval ReLU 85.17 55.10 51.85
5× 10−4 train ReLU 84.17 57.34 53.51
5× 10−4 eval ReLU 85.34 58.54 54.64
5× 10−4 eval Softplus 84.66 58.05 54.20
WRN-34-20 5× 10
−4 eval ReLU 86.93 57.93 54.42
5× 10−4 eval Softplus 85.43 57.94 54.32
Threat model: `∞ constraint,  = 8/255
Architecture Weight decay BN mode Activation Clean PGD-10 AA
WRN-34-10
2× 10−4 train ReLU 84.50 54.60 50.94
2× 10−4 eval ReLU 85.17 54.58 51.54
5× 10−4 train ReLU 84.04 57.41 53.83
5× 10−4 eval ReLU 85.48 57.45 53.80
5× 10−4 eval Softplus 84.24 57.59 53.88
WRN-34-20
2× 10−4 train ReLU 84.50 53.86 51.18
2× 10−4 eval ReLU 85.48 53.21 50.59
5× 10−4 train ReLU 85.87 57.40 54.22
5× 10−4 eval ReLU 86.43 57.91 54.39
5× 10−4 eval Softplus 85.51 57.50 54.21
3.3 COMBINATION OF TRICKS
In the above, we separately evaluate the effect of each training trick in the AT procedure. Now
we investigate combining the selected useful tricks, which involve label smoothing, weight decay,
activation function and BN mode. As demonstrated in Table 8, the improvements are not ideally
additive by combining different tricks, while label smoothing and smooth activation function are
helpful, but not significant, especially when we apply model architectures with a larger capacity.
We also find that the high performance of the models trained by Rice et al. (2020) partially comes
from its reasonable training settings, compared to previous work. Based on these, we provide a trick
list for training robust models on CIFAR-10 for reference.
Baseline setting (CIFAR-10):
Batch size 128; initial learning rate 0.1 (decay factor 10 at 100 and 105 epochs, totally 110 epochs);
SGD momentum optimizer; weight decay 5 × 10−4; eval mode BN for generating adversarial
examples; warmups are not necessary; label smoothing and smooth activation function are optional.
3.4 RE-IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADES
As a sanity check, we re-implement TRADES to see if our conclusions derived from PGD-AT can
generalize and provide the results in Table 9. We can observe that after simply changing the weight
decay from 2× 10−4 to 5× 10−4, the clean accuracy of TRADES improves by ∼ 1% and the AA
accuracy improves by ∼ 4%, which make the trained model surpass the previously state-of-the-
art models reported by the AutoAttack benchmark, as listed in Table 13. This fact highlights the
importance of employing a standardized training setting for fair comparisons of different AT methods.
4 CONCLUSION
In this work, we take a step in examining how the usually neglected implementation details impact
the performance of adversarially trained models. Our empirical results suggest that compared to
clean accuracy, robustness is more sensitive to some seemingly unimportant differences in training
settings. Thus when building AT methods, we should more carefully fine-tune the training settings
(on validation sets), or follow certain long-tested setup in the adversarial setting.
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A TECHNICAL DETAILS
In this section we introduce more related backgrounds and technical details for reference.
A.1 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Since the seminal L-BFGS and FGSM attacks (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015), a
large amount of attacking methods on generating adversarial examples have been introduced. In the
white-box setting, gradient-based methods are popular and powerful, which span in the `∞ threat
model (Nguyen et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018), `2 threat model (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a), `1 threat
model (Chen et al., 2018), and `0 threat model (Papernot et al., 2016). In the black-box setting, the
attack strategies are much more diverse. These include transfer-based attacks (Dong et al., 2018;
2019; Cheng et al., 2019b), quasi-gradient attacks (Chen et al., 2017a; Uesato et al., 2018; Ilyas et al.,
2018), and decision-based attacks (Brendel et al., 2018; Cheng et al., 2019a). Adversarial attacks can
be also realized in the physical world (Kurakin et al., 2017; Song et al., 2018a). Below we formulate
the PGD attack and AutoAttack that we used in our evaluations.
PGD attack. One of the most commonly studied adversarial attack is the projected gradient descent
(PGD) method (Madry et al., 2018). Let x0 be a randomly perturbed sample in the neighborhood of
the clean input x, then PGD iteratively crafts the adversarial example as
xi = clipx,(xi−1 + i · sign(∇xi−1L(xi−1, y))), (1)
where clipx,(·) is the clipping function and L is the adversarial objective. The accuracy under PGD
attack has been a standard metric to evaluate the model robustness.
AutoAttack. Croce & Hein (2020b) first propose the Auto-PGD (APGD) algorithm, where the main
idea is to automatically tune the adversarial step sizes according to the optimization trend. As to the
adversarial objective, except for the traditional cross-entropy (CE) loss, they develop a new difference
of logits ratio (DLR) loss as
DLR(x, y) = −zy −maxi6=y zi
zpi1 − zpi3
, (2)
where z is the logits and pi is the ordering which sorts the components of z. Finally, the authors
propose to group APGDCE and APGDDLR with FAB (Croce & Hein, 2020a) and square attack (An-
driushchenko et al., 2020) to form the AutoAttack (AA).
A.2 REFERENCE CODES
In Table 10, we provide the code links for the referred defenses. The summarized training settings
are either described in their papers or manually retrieved by us in their code implementations.
Table 10: We summarize the code links for the referred defense methods in Table 1.
Method Code link
Madry et al. (2018) github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge
Cai et al. (2018) github.com/sunblaze-ucb/curriculum-adversarial-training-CAT
Zhang et al. (2019b) github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES
Wang et al. (2019) github.com/YisenWang/dynamic_adv_training
Mao et al. (2019) github.com/columbia/Metric_Learning_Adversarial_Robustness
Carmon et al. (2019) github.com/yaircarmon/semisup-adv
Alayrac et al. (2019) github.com/deepmind/deepmind-research/unsupervised_adversarial_training
Shafahi et al. (2019b) github.com/ashafahi/free_adv_train
Zhang et al. (2019a) github.com/a1600012888/YOPO-You-Only-Propagate-Once
Zhang & Wang (2019) github.com/Haichao-Zhang/FeatureScatter
Atzmon et al. (2019) github.com/matanatz/ControllingNeuralLevelsets
Wong et al. (2020) github.com/locuslab/fast_adversarial
Rice et al. (2020) github.com/locuslab/robust_overfitting
Ding et al. (2020) github.com/BorealisAI/mma_training
Pang et al. (2020a) github.com/P2333/Max-Mahalanobis-Training
Zhang et al. (2020) github.com/zjfheart/Friendly-Adversarial-Training
Huang et al. (2020) github.com/LayneH/self-adaptive-training
Lee et al. (2020) github.com/Saehyung-Lee/cifar10_challenge
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A.3 MODEL ARCHITECTURES
We select some typical hand-crafted model architectures as the objects of study, involving
DenseNet (Huang et al., 2017), GoogleNet (Szegedy et al., 2015), (PreAct) ResNet (He et al.,
2016), SENet (Hu et al., 2018), WRN (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016), DPN (Chen et al., 2017b),
ResNeXt (Xie et al., 2017), and RegNetX (Radosavovic et al., 2020). The models are implemented
by https://github.com/kuangliu/pytorch-cifar.
Table 11: Number of parameters for different model architectures.
Architecture # of param. Architecture # of param. Architecture # of param.
DenseNet-121 28.29 M DPN26 46.47 M GoogleNet 24.81 M
DenseNet-201 73.55 M DPN92 137.50 M ResNeXt-29 36.65 M
RegNetX (200MF) 9.42 M ResNet-18 44.70 M SENet-18 45.09 M
RegNetX (400MF) 19.34 M ResNet-50 94.28 M WRN-34-10 193.20 M
A.4 INFERENCE-PHASE ADVERSARIAL DEFENSES
Except for enhancing the models in the training phase, there are other methods that intend to improve
robustness in the inference phase. These attempts include performing local linear transformation
like adding Gaussian noise (Tabacof & Valle, 2016), different operations of image processing (Guo
et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018; Raff et al., 2019) or specified inference principle (Pang et al., 2020b).
On the other hand, detection-based methods aim to filter out adversarial examples and resort to
higher-level intervention. Although detection is a suboptimal strategy compared to classification, it
can avoid over-confident wrong decisions. These efforts include training auxiliary classifiers to detect
adversarial inputs (Metzen et al., 2017), designing detection statistics (Feinman et al., 2017; Ma et al.,
2018; Pang et al., 2018a), or basing on additional probabilistic models (Song et al., 2018b).
16
Preprint and under review
B ADDITIONAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide additional results to further support the conclusions in the main text.
B.1 EARLY DECAYS LEARNING RATE
As shown in Fig. 1, smaller values of weight decay make the training faster but also more tend to
overfit. So in Fig. 3, we early decay the learning rate at 40 and 45 epochs, rather than 100 and 105
epochs. We can see that the models can achieve the same clean accuracy, but the weight decay of
5 × 10−4 can still achieve better robustness. Besides, in Fig. 4, we use different values of weight
decay for standard training, where the models can also achieve similar clean accuracy. These results
demonstrate that adversarial robustness is a more difficult target than clean performance, and is more
sensitive to the training hyperparameters, both for standardly and adversarially trained models.
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Figure 3: Curves of test accuracy w.r.t. training epochs, where the model is WRN-34-10. Here we
early decay the learning rate at 40 and 45 epochs for the cases of weight decay 1×10−4 and 2×10−4,
just before they overfitting. We can see that the models can achieve the same clean accuracy as weight
decay 5× 10−4, but still worse robustness.
0 50 100 150 200
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
1  10-4
2  10-4
5  10-4
Epochs
Cl
ea
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
Figure 4: Curves of test accuracy w.r.t. training epochs. The model architecture is WRN-34-10,
and is standardly trained on CIFAR-10. We can observe that the final performance of each model is
comparable, which means that clean accuracy is less sensitive to different values of weight decay.
This observation also holds for the adversarially trained models as shown in Fig. 1.
B.2 THE EFFECT OF SMOOTH ACTIVATION FUNCTION
In Table 12 we test the effect of Softplus and BN mode on ResNet-18.
Table 12: Test accuracy (%) of TRADES. We compare with the results in Table 6 to check the effect
of smooth activation function on TRADES, as well as the compatibility of it with eval BN mode.
Threat model: `∞ constraint,  = 8/255
Architecture Weight decay BN mode Activation Clean PGD-10 AA
ResNet-18
5× 10−4 train ReLU 80.23 53.60 48.96
5× 10−4 train Softplus 81.26 54.58 50.35
5× 10−4 eval ReLU 81.45 53.51 49.06
5× 10−4 eval Softplus 82.37 54.37 50.51
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B.3 RANK IN THE AUTOATTACK BENCHMARK
The models evaluated in this paper are all retrained based on the released codes (Zhang et al., 2019b;
Rice et al., 2020). Now we compare our trained models with the AutoAttack public benchmark,
where the results of previous work are based on the released pretrained models. In Table 13, we
retrieve our results in Table 9 on the TRADES model where we simply change the weight decay from
2× 10−4 to 5× 10−4. We can see that this seemingly unimportant difference sends the TRADES
model back to the state-of-the-art position in the benchmark.
Table 13: We retrieve the results of top-rank methods from https://github.com/fra31/
auto-attack. All the methods listed below do not require additional training data on CIFAR-10.
Here the model of Ours (TRADES) corresponds to lines of weight decay 5× 10−4, eval BN mode
and ReLU activation in Table 9, which only differs from the original TRADES in weight decay.
Threat model: `∞ constraint,  = 8/255
Method Architecture Clean AA
Ours (TRADES) WRN-34-20 86.43 54.39
Ours (TRADES) WRN-34-10 85.48 53.80
Pang et al. (2020c) WRN-34-20 85.14 53.74
Zhang et al. (2020) WRN-34-10 84.52 53.51
Rice et al. (2020) WRN-34-20 85.34 53.42
Qin et al. (2019) WRN-40-8 86.28 52.84
Threat model: `∞ constraint,  = 0.031
Method Architecture Clean AA
Ours (TRADES) WRN-34-10 85.34 54.64
Huang et al. (2020) WRN-34-10 83.48 53.34
Zhang et al. (2019b) WRN-34-10 84.92 53.08
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